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e under theAbstract The goal of syndromic surveillance is the earlier detection of epidemics,
allowing a timelier public health response than is possible using traditional surveil-
lance methods. Syndromic surveillance application for public health purposes has
changed over time and reflects a dynamic evolution from the collection, interpreta-
tion of data with dissemination of data to those who need to act, to a more holistic
approach that incorporates response as a core component of the surveillance sys-
tem. Recent infectious disease threats, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), avian influenza (H5N1) and pandemic influenza (H1N1), have all highlighted
the need for countries to be rapidly aware of the spread of infectious diseases within
a region and across the globe. The International Health Regulations (IHR) obligation
to report public health emergencies of international concern has raised the impor-
tance of early outbreak detection and response. The emphasis in syndromic surveil-
lance is changing from automated, early alert and detection, to situational
awareness and response. Published literature on syndromic surveillance reflects
the changing nature of public health threats and responses. Syndromic surveillance
has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to rapidly shifting public health
needs. This adaptability makes it a highly relevant public health tool.
ª 2013 Ministry of Health, Saudi Arabia. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Syndromic surveillance provides an indication of
disease patterns, a method for detecting aberra-3 Ministry of Health, Saudi Ar
2.12.005
Bag 10, Wallsend, 2287
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CC BY-NC-ND license (http://tions in health data, or a signal that an event of
public health concern is occurring. Syndromic sur-
veillance systems have been implemented since
the 1990s, initially with a focus on bioterrorism
event detection.
Last (2001) [1] defines a syndrome as: ‘‘A symp-
tom complex in which the symptoms and/or signs
coexist more frequently than would be expectedabia. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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surveillance terms, syndromic relates to a specific
set of symptoms not requiring laboratory confirma-
tion for diagnosis. Common examples of syndromes
used for syndromic surveillance include: acute flac-
cid paralysis (AFP), a syndrome potentially indica-
tive of poliomyelitis; influenza-like-illness (ILI); or
acute fever and rash, a syndrome potentially indica-
tive of measles.
Syndromic surveillance captures a spectrum of
approaches ranging from fully automated systems,
using sophisticated statistical algorithms, to simple
manual systems. It includes very specific case def-
initions for syndromes such as AFP to the generic
counting of over-the-counter medications for
coughs and colds. As it is based on clinical syn-
dromes rather than laboratory confirmation, it is
also potentially useful in settings where there is
limited timely access to laboratories, including
many developing countries [2]. As an approach,
syndromic surveillance incorporates elements of
data collection and analysis of specific syndromes
or indicators (to detect disease), verification (that
disease actually exists), information sharing (to
those who need to know in order to respond), feed-
back to those who collected the data (to confirm
that an action is occurring), and, in many recent
cases, response and control measures to mitigate
global health security threats.
Recent infectious disease threats such as SARS,
avian influenza (H5N1) and pandemic influenza
(H1N1) have highlighted the need for governments
and public health agencies to rapidly learn of poten-
tial infectious disease threats to facilitate timely and
appropriate public health responses. The require-
ment for improved early warning and response sys-
tems may be reshaping global health surveillance
[3]. The published literature on syndromic surveil-
lance reflects the changing nature of these threats
and responses. Over time, syndromic surveillance
has been applied to a remarkable range of public
health issues using a wide variety of data sources.
Not only has it been used to collect data on particular
disease syndromes, but it has also been used to mon-
itor the publics health following, or during, natural
disasters, such as the Icelandic ash cloud, mass gath-
erings, heat waves, floods or pandemics.
This paper documents the evolution of syn-
dromic surveillance from bioterrorist detection
systems to those implemented for outbreak detec-
tion and response. By characterising the changing
approaches used in syndromic surveillance, and
the drivers for this change, it demonstrates the
encouraging adaptability of syndromic surveillance
and the important role it plays in public health.2. Methodology
An analysis of published articles on syndromic sur-
veillance was undertaken in published English-lan-
guage literature to examine the evolution of
syndromic surveillance. MEDLINE, EMBASE, Scopus
and Web of Science databases were searched using
the term ‘‘syndromic surveillance’’ for English lan-
guage studies published prior to February 2012.
After removing duplicates and non-English language
articles, 415 records were obtained. Citations were
downloaded into Endnote X4. Reference lists were
then hand searched to obtain further relevant addi-
tional published articles and a total of 769 articles
were thus included in the study.
To identify trends in the publication of syn-
dromic surveillance articles, PubMed was searched
for all articles with the term syndromic surveil-
lance in the title or abstract, as published in Pub-
Med prior to 20 February, 2012; 214 articles were
obtained and were downloaded into Endnote X4.
This database was then searched to identify publi-
cation year for each article and the number of arti-
cles published each year. The database was further
searched using the terms bioterrorism and influ-
enza to identify articles published each year on
these topics. Keywords assigned to these articles
were extracted for the periods 2001–2004, 2005–
2008, and 2009–2011, based on visual changes in
the data, and these were imported into NVivo 9.
Each of these time-periods was queried and a tag
cloud created. Tag clouds represent by size the fre-
quency of a particular word in a document, or in
this case the frequency of keywords used in syn-
dromic surveillance publications. The tag cloud
used a Word search for the 100 most frequent
words with the following characteristics: a mini-
mum length of six characters; matching set to in-
clude stemmed words; and used the following
Stop words – epidemiology, methods, statistics,
and numerical – to reduce visual confusion in the
tag cloud results.3. Results and discussion
In this study, published literature was examined to
assess the evolving usage of syndromic surveillance
for public health purposes.
While generally acknowledged as a simplified
view of the many approaches used in syndromic
surveillance, predominantly two different ap-
proaches were commonly reported in the litera-
ture. The first is based on networked systems and
encompasses the timely, automated extraction,
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multiple data sources, with alerts generated when
there is an exceedance of a baseline threshold
using statistical methods. The emphasis in this ap-
proach is on the timely, automated collection of
data; the application of a syndromic algorithm to
clinical or non-clinical data; the use of statistical
methods to recognise that the data are exceeding
a defined threshold or to monitor trends; and the
generation of alerts to those who need to know
so that a response can be implemented. This form
of syndromic surveillance is traditionally associ-
ated with systems designed to rapidly detect biot-
errorism events. An example is the Essence
(Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notifi-
cation of Community-Based Epidemics), a bio-
surveillance system used in the United States which
uses aberration detection algorithms of syndrome
groups, extracted from ICD-9 classification groups,
to detect whether the observed count is above or
below the expected count [4].
The second approach involved the regular,
timely reporting of syndromic activity, based on
agreed case definitions, at sentinel sites; detection
of outbreaks, either based on an exceedance of his-
torical data, or the reporting of syndromic cases in
excess of the number clinicians would usually ex-
pect (which may include the reporting of unusual
medical events); proportionate investigation and
response; and regular feedback to concerned par-
ties. The emphasis here was on both detection
and response, with low technological requirements
making it suitable for use in developing regions. An
example of this is the syndromic surveillance sys-
tem established in the Pacific Island Countries
and Territories (PICT) [5].
3.1. Early application of syndromic
surveillance in public health
The different approaches reflect the flexibility of
syndromic surveillance to adapt to changing public
health requirements and, while not truly linear in
time, noticeable trends or themes are apparent
in the literature. An exploration of the literature
revealed that while public health surveillance was
being discussed and implemented from the early
1960s, based on the visionary work of Langmuir
[6] and Raska [7], with many of the principles
developed then still applicable, the term syn-
dromic surveillance only regularly entered peer-re-
viewed literature at the beginning of the twentieth
century.
In the 1980s, the goal of global eradication of
polio resulted in acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) sur-
veillance being implemented globally as the keysurveillance measure for the eradication of polio
[8]. T. Jacob John also established a novel, dis-
trict-level disease surveillance system in Southern
India [9], which sought to control and limit disease
outbreaks through early detection (described by a
standardised set of symptoms); regular reporting
and response; and would be termed a syndromic
surveillance system if implemented today. This
model included elements of data collection, analy-
sis, confirmation, feedback and response – all key
elements of modern-day syndromic surveillance.
This approach was later further adapted in a rural
African setting with a focus on rural hospitals
reporting presentations of nine core clinical syn-
dromes, including cholera and meningitis-like dis-
ease [10].
In the 1990s, the STD and HIV literature docu-
mented the value of syndrome-based diagnosis
and treatment for case management purposes
[11,12]. There were also some early examples of
outbreak surveillance systems based on syndromes
in developed countries. Among other examples,
New York City implemented a syndromic surveil-
lance system to detect outbreaks of waterborne ill-
ness using surveillance for diarrhoeal illness, stool
submissions in laboratories and over-the-counter
(OTC) pharmacy sales [13]; and public health offi-
cials in England compared data collected through
a call centre (NHS Direct), using an algorithm for
influenza-like symptoms, to routinely available sur-
veillance data to assess the usefulness of syn-
dromic surveillance for influenza surveillance [14].3.2. Syndromic surveillance application in
response to the bioterrorism threat
In the literature there was an apparent surge in
interest in syndromic surveillance following the
terrorist events in the United States of America,
the United Kingdom and Spain, as well as the
2001 anthrax outbreak [15]. The word syndromic
was applied because the majority of such systems
monitored syndromes which might herald the early
stages of epidemics [16]. Fig. 1 presents a graphic
representation of the adaptability of syndromic
surveillance as public health requirements for
information have changed. A review of the pub-
lished literature on syndromic surveillance shows
the rapid growth in publications following the ter-
rorist attacks, with the number of publications
published each year peaking in 2004, after the
emergence of SARS. These events appear to have
accelerated the development of syndromic surveil-
lance as a tool for the early identification of unex-
pected biological events [17].
Figure 1 Trends in syndromic surveillance publica-
tions, 2001–2011.
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infectious disease threats
Fig. 1 demonstrates that from 2005 there was a de-
crease in the number of publications addressing
bioterrorism and a shift in focus to emergent dis-
eases and pandemics (with influenza used here
as a proxy indicator). A second wave of interest
in syndromic surveillance is apparent from 2008
after the emergence of avian influenza and the
2009 influenza pandemic. Tag clouds, as shown in
Fig. 2, highlight the predominance of bioterrorism
as a keyword in syndromic surveillance publications
from 2001 to 2004, and its lessening importance
over time. In contrast, influenza and outbreaks in-
crease in importance reflecting increasing public
health activities in these two areas from 2005 to
2011.
Many recent emergent pathogenic infectious dis-
eases have signalled their emergence through cases
presenting with particular syndromes, such as
encephalitis, influenza-like-illness (ILI) or severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), emphasising
the importance of surveillance for syndromes as a
method of detecting emergent diseases. The highly
pathogenic Nipah and Hendra viruses presented as
an encephalitic syndrome with a high case fatality
rate [18,19]. The arrival of SARS in 2003 focused
the worlds attention on emerging infectious dis-
eases (EID) [16], the potential for an EID to cause
‘‘significant social and economic disruption,’’ and
the need for early identification to limit further
spread [20]. SARS was the first infectious disease
event in modern times that confirmed how rapidly
a deadly disease could spread across the globe and
the subsequent cost to infected individuals and af-
fected countries economies [21]. More recently, asyndromic approach first signalled a disturbing,
unusual event occurring in Jordan when an appar-
ent cluster of cases and fatalities from an unknown
disease presented as a SARS with renal complica-
tions. It was only when this disease was finally iden-
tified, in a later case, as a novel coronavirus that
the mystery behind the unusual cluster was solved
[22]. Enhanced syndromic surveillance for further
SARS presentation due to this novel coronavirus
has currently been recommended at the global le-
vel by the World Health Organization [23].
The advent of SARS in 2003 led public health
officials in developed economies to appreciate
the potential benefits of syndromic surveillance
to public health beyond bioterrorism and the possi-
bility that it could be used to detect unusual dis-
ease clusters [24,25]. The influenza pandemic
(H1N1) in 2009 also highlighted the need for sur-
veillance systems able to provide early detection
of first cases through the identification of patients
with an ILI syndrome [26]. It also had value later
during the pandemic; Elliott (2009) noted that
when countries changed phase to containment,
and were no longer able to laboratory confirm each
case, then ‘‘syndromic surveillance takes prece-
dence as the primary means of estimating the com-
munity burden of pandemic influenza infections
[27].’’ As a result of the pandemic, and in an effort
to improve public health surveillance, the CDC sta-
ted that it was ‘‘expanding and automating syn-
dromic surveillance [28].’’
3.4. Syndromic surveillance and the
International Health Regulations
The 2005 IHR revision required all countries to de-
velop certain minimum core public health capaci-
ties, including the ability to detect and respond
to communicable disease outbreaks, and the rapid
reporting of public health emergencies of interna-
tional concern to the World Health Organization
(WHO) [29]. Included in the IHR core capacity
requirements are: ‘‘surveillance, reporting, notifi-
cation, verification, response and collaboration
activities [29].’’ The IHR obligation to report pub-
lic health emergencies of international concern
have raised the importance of early outbreak
detection and response.
Standardised approaches to data collection,
analysis, reporting, outbreak investigation and re-
sponse are necessary for a surveillance system to
effectively serve as an early warning system for
biological, chemical or radiological threats. Evalu-
ations of syndromic surveillance systems are neces-
sary to confirm that they are able to meet public
health requirements and obligations by adequately
Figure 2 Tag clouds for keywords extracted from published literature on syndromic surveillance, 2001–2011.
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when an outbreak is detected, that there is an
appropriate public health response [30,31].
For developing countries, where there are often
long delays in laboratory confirmation, the imple-
mentation of simple syndromic surveillance sys-
tems may provide the opportunity to ensure acountrys early warning and response capacity
[32]. The Pacific Island Countries and Territories
(PICT) have developed a syndromic surveillance
system to respond to an identified need for a
functional surveillance system, capable of identify-
ing and responding to outbreaks in a systematic
manner, while taking account of limited local
46 B.J. Paterson, D.N. Durrheimresources. In 2010, all PICTs agreed to implement a
syndromic surveillance system to facilitate early
warning and response, to meet these IHR obliga-
tions [33]. A further refinement was the develop-
ment of response protocols to standardise
responses to outbreaks [34,35].
An evolving purpose of syndromic surveillance is
to improve real-time situational awareness which
follows an outbreak from detection to response.
Buehler et al. (2008) describe situational aware-
ness as ‘‘the ability to monitor the course of out-
breaks regardless of how they are detected,’’ and
to ‘‘track, characterise and monitor trends [36].’’
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) (2010) describe the use of situational aware-
ness for surveillance purposes as ‘‘public health
professionals processing innumerable bits of data,
assigning meaning, ascertaining significance,
determining implications, and acting and adjusting
accordingly.’’ Situational awareness reflects the
notion that information for incremental decision-
making does not just come from a single source
and that syndromic surveillance can help to make
sense of the ‘‘epidemiological puzzle [37].’’4. Conclusions
Syndromic surveillance has many applications in
the public health field particularly, in recent times,
for health security and the early detection of
emerging health threats. Syndromic surveillance
application for public health purposes has changed
over time and reflects a dynamic evolution from
the collection, interpretation of data, and dissem-
ination of data to those who need to act; to a more
holistic approach that incorporates response as a
core component of the surveillance system.
The IHR obligation to report public health emer-
gencies of international concern have accentuated
the importance of early outbreak detection and re-
sponse. Syndromic surveillance evolution has not
been completely linear, but rather approaches
have co-existed and evolved over time. The use
of a syndromic surveillance approach to detect
outbreaks and unusual patterns is not without its
critics. Henning (2004) suggested cautious use of
syndromic surveillance, noting that it should not
replace traditional systems or the reporting by cli-
nicians of unusual events [17]. Other challenges in-
clude the availability of resources for follow-up,
movement of persons after exposure and the diffi-
culty of detecting unusual events during seasonal
increases in disease [15].
Using published literature to demonstrate the
evolution of syndromic surveillance has somelimitations, as the literature may not be represen-
tative of what is actually being implemented in
public health programs. Publication bias and a lack
of publications from the developing countries may
also limit the validity of this approach.
Syndromic surveillance as applied to infectious
diseases serves a wide number of purposes, includ-
ing: early detection of threats and hazards, and a
timelier public health response, identifying
changes in severity of a particular disease, identi-
fying emergent diseases, developing baselines or
thresholds so that unusual occurrences can be de-
tected, and demonstrating the effectiveness and
progress of interventions. A number of authors
have suggested that syndromic surveillance is
appropriate for developing regions [32,38,39] par-
ticularly in view of the difficulties these areas have
in receiving laboratory confirmations in a timely
manner. The recognition that decision-making
and public health responses are based on informa-
tion from a range of sources has highlighted the va-
lue of syndromic surveillance to improve
situational awareness.
Syndromic surveillance has demonstrated a
remarkable ability to adapt to rapidly shifting pub-
lic health needs and the flexibility to utilise differ-
ent approaches depending on the situation. This
adaptability makes it a highly relevant public
health tool. Central to this is the public health
requirement for credible, rapidly available surveil-
lance information to allow informed decisions on
responding to and controlling emerging threats.
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